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I. INTRODUCTION 
Inherited genetic disorders are a well-known cause of 
developmental delays in children. It is, therefore, “foreseeable” to 
physicians treating developmentally delayed children that parents 
of these children will rely on the physicians’ opinions of whether a 
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genetic cause exists.  Accordingly in 1992, when Dr. Diane Meier, a 
pediatrician, discovered developmental delays in S.F., the three-
year-old daughter of Kimberly Flomer (now Molloy)1 and Robert 
Flomer, “accepted standards of pediatric practice” required Dr. 
Meier to order genetic testing,2 including testing for Fragile X 
Syndrome, one of the most common causes of inherited mental 
retardation.3  The foreseeable consequences of Dr. Meier’s alleged 
failure to obtain Fragile X testing and the timing of those 
consequences provide the factual basis for a genetic counseling 
medical malpractice action that raises unique and challenging 
issues involving the legal duty of a physician to a non-patient, the 
accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, and 
the ability of parents to bring a wrongful conception cause of 
action for the birth of a child with a genetic disorder.4  In the case 
of Molloy v. Meier, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed these 
issues following a denial of summary judgment by the district court 
and affirmance by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 5 
The purpose of this note is to analyze the court’s discussion of 
these issues, identify questions raised by the court’s rationale and 
its holding, and offer suggestions on how these questions might be 
addressed in the future. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
S.F. came under the care and treatment of Dr. Diane M. 
Meier, a pediatrician, at an early age.6  When S.F. was three years 
old, Dr. Meier discovered that S.F. was developmentally delayed.7  
On May 18, 1992, Dr. Meier met with Molloy, Robert Flomer, and 
S.F. to discuss possible causes for S.F.’s developmental delays, 
including the possibility of a genetic cause.8  As a result of that 
meeting, Dr. Meier agreed to order genetic tests to determine if 
S.F. had an inherited genetic disorder.9 
 
 1. Kimberly Flomer later married Glenn Molloy, and took his surname.  For 
the sake of convenience, this article will most often refer to her simply as “Molloy.” 
 2. See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Minn. 2004). 
 3. Id. n.2. 
 4. See id. at 716. 
 5. Id. at 715–16. 
 6. Id. at 713–14. 
 7. Id. at 714. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
2
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Dr. Meier’s notes and her subsequent testimony establish that 
she intended to order chromosomal testing and testing for Fragile 
X Syndrome.10  Fragile X Syndrome is an “X-linked” single gene 
disorder.11  Dr. Meier conceded “it was appropriate to test [S.F.] for 
Fragile X in keeping with accepted standards of pediatric practice 
on May 18, 1992.”12  Molloy contended that if S.F. tested positive for 
the genetic disorder, Molloy should have been tested as well, 
though Dr. Meier did not concede this.13 
Pursuant to Dr. Meier’s directions, S.F. underwent genetic 
testing at North Memorial Medical Center on June 17, 1992.14  
Although she intended to order both chromosome and Fragile X 
testing, Dr. Meier testified that no testing for Fragile X was 
performed.15  On July 18, 1992, North Memorial’s laboratory 
reported to Dr. Meier that the chromosome testing was “normal.”16  
Thereafter, Dr. Meier telephoned Molloy and Robert Flomer and 
advised them that the test results were “normal.”17  Molloy and 
Flomer assumed that the Fragile X testing had been completed as 
well, and therefore assumed that the negative or normal test results 
included a negative result for Fragile X.18 
In addition to examinations by Dr. Meier, S.F. was examined 
on June 23, 1992, by Dr. Reno Backus, a pediatric neurologist, and 
on April 30, 1996, by Dr. Kathryn Green, also a pediatric 
neurologist.19  Neither Dr. Backus nor Dr. Green recommended or 
ordered testing for Fragile X Syndrome.20  The plaintiff identified 
expert testimony stating that accepted standards of medical 
practice under the circumstances required Dr. Backus and Dr. 
Green to consider a genetic cause for S.F.’s pervasive 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. A person with Fragile X Syndrome has a mutation of the DNA on the 
FMR1 gene of the X chromosome that results in a failure of the person to make a 
specific protein.  The absence of this protein sets in motion a cascade of 
biochemical events that result in the characteristics of Fragile X Syndrome.  
Accordingly, a child can inherit an X chromosome carrying the mutant FMR1 
gene from either or both parents.  See id. at 714 n.2. 
 12. Id. at 714. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. n.3. 
 16. Id. at 714. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 714–15. 
 20. Id. at 715. 
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developmental delay and to order genetic testing, including a test 
for Fragile X Syndrome.21 
Sometime after 1992, Kimberly Flomer married Glenn 
Molloy.22  On June 30, 1998, Kimberly Molloy gave birth to M.M., 
who showed signs of the same developmental difficulties as S.F.23  
M.M.’s pediatrician ordered Fragile X testing and the results were 
positive.24  M.M.’s pediatrician then counseled Kimberly and Glenn 
Molloy about Fragile X Syndrome and recommended that they and 
other potentially affected family members receive testing.25  
Subsequent tests revealed that both S.F. and Kimberly Molloy 
tested positive for Fragile X.26  Molloy commenced a cause of action 
against Drs. Meier, Backus, and Green on August 23, 2001.27  After 
some discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.28 
The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment and certified three questions to the court of appeals.29  
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and review was 
granted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.30  The three certified 
questions were as follows: 
(a) Does a physician who allegedly fails to test for and 
diagnose a genetic disorder in an existing child leading to 
the birth of a subsequent child with that disorder owe a 
legal duty to the child’s parents? 
(b) When does the statute of limitations begin to run 
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.076 (2002) in a parents’ 
medical negligence claim alleging failure to test for and 
diagnose a genetic disorder in an existing child leading to 
the birth of a subsequent child with that disorder? 
(c) Does Minn. Stat. § 145.424 prohibit parents from 
bringing an action alleging that they would not have 
conceived the subsequent child described in question 
(b)?31 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 715. 
 29. Id. at 715–16. 
 30. Id. at 713, 716. 
 31. Id. at 716. 
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The court of appeals used Skillings v. Allen32 to guide its analysis 
in determining whether a duty runs to the parents in this case.  In 
Skillings, a physician negligently advised the parents of a minor 
child regarding the safety of visiting their child who was 
hospitalized with scarlet fever.  Relying on the physician’s advice, 
the parents visited their child, and subsequently both parents 
contracted scarlet fever.33  In holding that the physician was liable 
for negligently advising the parents, and finding that a duty flowed 
from the physician to the minor patient’s parents, the Skillings 
court held that the parents received negligent advice from the 
physician, and that it was foreseeable the parents would rely on this 
advice.34  In Molloy, the court of appeals reasoned that, as in 
Skillings, there was evidence in the record that Kimberly Molloy 
received and relied upon direct advice from the defendants.  The 
court noted that the genetic testing that was discussed was not 
ordered to benefit S.F., but to inform Molloy whether she was a 
carrier for the genetic abnormality.35  The court concluded that the 
physicians involved had a duty to properly advise S.F.’s biological 
parents when advising about the risks of conceiving a subsequent 
child.36 
Next, the court of appeals considered the question of when 
the cause of action accrued.  Citing Offerdahl v. University of 
Minnesota Hospital & Clinics37 and Peterson v. St. Cloud Hospital,38 the 
court held that it is the alleged negligence combined with the alleged 
resulting damage that determines when the cause of action 
accrues.39  Finding that damage did not occur until conception of 
M.M., the court held that the cause of action accrued in 
September, 1997, and therefore was not time-barred by the 
limitations period in Minnesota Statutes section 541.076.40  Finally, 
the court held that the plain language of Minnesota Statutes 
section 145.424 does not prohibit wrongful conception actions.41 
 
 32. 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919). 
 33. 143 Minn. at 324, 173 N.W. at 663. 
 34. 143 Minn. at 324–25, 173 N.W. at 663. 
 35. Molloy v. Meier, 660 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 36. Id. at 453. 
 37. 426 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Minn. 1988). 
 38. 460 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 39. Molloy, 660 N.W.2d at 455. 
 40. Id. at 456. 
 41. Id. 
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III. SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A. A Physician’s Duty to Inform Biological Parents About Genetic 
Implications of a Child’s Genetic Disorder 
 
The issue regarding legal duty was framed as follows: Molloy 
argued that a physician-patient relationship existed between her 
and the physician defendants that “gave rise to a legal duty to warn 
her about the risks of becoming pregnant as a carrier of Fragile 
X.”42  Molloy further argued that “even if a physician-patient 
relationship [could not] be established, a physician’s duty to warn 
[non-patients] of a patient’s genetic disorder arises from the 
foreseeability of injury.”43  The physicians, on the other hand, 
argued they owed a duty only to S.F., and such duty did not extend 
to any family members.44 
A medical malpractice action is based upon the principles of 
tort liability for negligence.  To establish a prima facie case of 
medical malpractice for negligent medical treatment, a plaintiff 
must show: 
(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical 
community as applicable to the particular defendant’s 
conduct; 
(2) that the defendant in fact departed from that 
standard; 
(3) that the defendant’s departure from that standard was 
a direct cause of the patient’s injuries; and 
(4) legal damages.45 
Generally, the legal duty arises from the physician-patient 
relationship.  Therefore, the existence of a physician-patient 
relationship is an essential element of proof in a medical 
malpractice action.46  The physician-patient relationship is a 
fiduciary relationship in which it is foreseeable that negligent or 
 
 42. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2004). 
 43. Id. at 716–17.  See, e.g., Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Minn. 
1984); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919). 
 44. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717; see also McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 
446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
 45. Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1982); Miller v. 
Raaen, 273 Minn. 109, 113, 139 N.W.2d 877, 880 (1966) (including actual loss or 
damage as an element of malpractice). 
 46. McElwain, 447 N.W.2d at 445 (requiring doctor to exercise a certain 
degree of care and skill until the end of the doctor-patient relationship). 
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below standard care will result in harm; thus, the existence of a 
duty.47 
The question whether a physician owes a duty to inform a 
child’s biological parents about genetic implications of that child’s 
genetic disorder was one of first impression in Minnesota.48  The 
supreme court began its analysis by noting that the existence of a 
duty to a third party who is not a patient of the physician had been 
recognized in only a few Minnesota cases.49  For example, in 
Skillings, a minor child was hospitalized with scarlet fever.50  When 
the parents asked the child’s physician about the nature of the 
disease and the risk of infection, the physician negligently 
informed the parents that they could safely visit their daughter in 
the hospital and take her home even though the disease was in its 
most contagious stage.51  The Molloy court quoted Skillings for the 
proposition that “one is responsible for the direct consequences of 
his negligent actions whenever he is placed in such a position with 
regard to another that it is obvious that if he does not use due care 
in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that person.”52  The 
Molloy court added that “liability extends to the parents because the 
physician had an obligation to use due care in a situation where it 
was likely known that the parents would rely on the advice.”53 
Similarly, the Molloy court relied upon Cairl v. State.54  In Cairl, 
the court held that a treatment facility might owe a duty to warn 
identifiable third parties of violent propensities of a mentally 
disabled youth whom it released if that youth posed a specific 
threat to those parties.55   
Finally, the court relied upon Lundgren v. Fultz.56  The facts in 
Lundgren emphasize the roles of foreseeability and control or ability 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717. 
 49. Id. (citing Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984); Cairl v. State, 
323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 
(1919)). 
 50. 143 Minn. at 324, 173 N.W. at 663. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Skillings, 143 Minn. at 325-26, 173 N.W. 
at 663–64). 
 53. Id. at 717. 
 54. See 323 N.W.2d at 25–26 (finding a duty to warn when a specific threat is 
made against specific victims). 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. See 354 N.W.2d at 25. 
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to control in the determination of legal duty.57  In Lundgren, the 
action was commenced by the husband of a woman who was killed 
by a psychiatrist’s patient in a random act of violence.58  The 
evidence established that the psychiatrist had treated the patient 
for paranoid schizophrenia that manifested itself in violent and 
threatening behaviors.59  After a period of treatment including 
psychotropic medications, the patient appeared to be in 
remission.60  At one point in the treatment process, the University 
of Minnesota Police Department suggested that the patient’s guns 
be confiscated.61  The treating psychiatrist and the patient’s wife 
agreed, and the guns were brought to the police for safekeeping.62  
After the patient’s release from treatment, he sought return of his 
guns from the university police.63  The police contacted the 
psychiatrist and the psychiatrist wrote a letter stating that the 
patient had recovered from his mental illness and that the guns 
could be returned to the patient.64  After receiving the letter, the 
police turned over the guns to the patient who, several months 
later, used one of the guns to shoot and kill the plaintiff’s wife in 
an “unprovoked and random attack.”65   
The trial court granted summary judgment, asserting that the 
defendant psychiatrist had no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person to prevent the third person from causing injury or 
harm to another.66  The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the 
psychiatrist had played an active role in allowing his patient to have 
access to the guns and, therefore, there was a genuine issue of fact 
as to whether the psychiatrist had the ability to control the access to 
the guns and whether there was foreseeable harm.67  The court 
noted, “Foreseeability has been called the fundamental basis of the 
law of negligence.  Justice Cardozo succinctly expressed the central 
relationship between the foreseeability of harm and the existence 
of a legal duty in Palsgraf, stating that ‘the risk reasonably to be 
 
 57. Id. at 28 (imposing duty to control when the harm is foreseeable). 
 58. Id. at 26–27. 
 59. Id. at 26. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 27. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 26. 
 67. Id. at 28. 
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perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. . . .’”68  The Lundgren court 
held that close questions on foreseeability should be submitted to 
the jury.69 
In citing Skillings, Cairl, and Lundgren, the Molloy court 
recognized and followed the long established legal precedent that 
foreseeability of harm defines legal duty.  The court also 
referenced an attorney malpractice case, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, 
Miller & Keefe, noting the importance of the client’s reliance upon 
the advice of the attorney, and finding that there was sufficient 
evidence to support an attorney-client relationship because it was 
reasonably foreseeable that negligent advice would injure the 
plaintiff.70 
The Molloy court also found persuasive decisions from other 
jurisdictions that held that a physician owed a legal duty to the 
family of a patient who received negligent care in the field of 
genetics.71  The Molloy court found the analysis of the Supreme 
Court of Florida in the case of Pate v. Threlkel particularly helpful.  
There the Florida court held that a duty exists where “the 
prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is obviously for the 
benefit of certain identified third parties and the physician knows 
of the existence of those third parties.”72  Following the example of 
Pate, the Molloy court observed that 
the legal duty of physicians will be driven, at least in part, 
by the standard of care in the medical profession.  As this 
occurs, it is unlikely that the medical community will 
adopt a standard of care that is either unduly burdensome 
 
 68. Id. (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 
1928)); see also Christianson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Mpls. & Omaha Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 
94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) (Mitchell, J.) (“What a man may reasonably 
anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is 
negligent.”); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 31, 43 (4th ed. 
1971). 
 69. Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. 1984). 
 70. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 
1980). 
 71. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 2004) (citing Schroeder v. 
Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 1981) (holding that where a physician failed to 
diagnose cystic fibrosis in a first-born child, it was foreseeable that the parents 
would rely on the diagnosis, leading to the conception and birth of a second child 
with cystic fibrosis, and consequently liability attached);  Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 
764 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Colo. 1988) (holding the failure of a physician to diagnose a 
hereditary cause of blindness resulting in the conception of a subsequent child 
born with blindness stated a cause of action)). 
 72. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995). 
9
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or unbeneficial to patients. . . . The standard of care thus 
acknowledges that families rely on physicians to 
communicate a diagnosis of the genetic disorder to the 
patient’s family.  It is foreseeable that a negligent 
diagnosis of Fragile X will cause harm not only to the 
patient, but to the family of the patient as well.73 
The court then held that a “physician’s duty regarding genetic 
testing and diagnosis extends beyond the patient to the biological 
parents who foreseeably may be harmed by a breach of that duty.”74  
In this case, the parents were of childbearing years and it was 
foreseeable that they would conceive another child absent the 
knowledge of the genetic disorder.75  The doctors therefore owed a 
duty not only to S.F., but also to her parents.76  The scope of that 
duty could be determined by the accepted standards of practice. 
The court’s holding on legal duty was limited to the biological 
parents.77  The court did not address whether the duty recognized 
in Molloy extends beyond biological parents to others who 
foreseeably will rely on genetic testing and diagnosis and, 
therefore, foreseeably may be injured by the negligence in 
discharging the duty of care.78 
In summary, the Molloy court relied upon the evidence of a 
standard of care to test for genetic disorders under these 
circumstances in concluding that not only did biological parents 
rely upon genetic counseling under these circumstances, but that it 
was foreseeable that negligent counseling would result in harm.  
That duty is defined by the foreseeability of harm.79 
B. Genetic Counseling Action “Accrued” on Date of “Legal” Damage 
The second certified question concerned the application of 
Minnesota Statutes section 541.076 (b).  This statute provides that a 
medical malpractice cause of action “must be commenced within 
four years from the date the cause of action accrued.”80  Molloy 
commenced her cause of action in August of 2001, more than four 
 
 73. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 719. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 720. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. MINN. STAT. § 541.076 (b) (2002). 
10
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years after S.F.’s last treatment by any of the defendants, but within 
four years of the date of M.M.’s conception and birth. 
Minnesota courts have long applied the so-called “termination 
of treatment” rule to establish when a cause of action accrues.81  
The termination of treatment rule recognizes that where the 
negligence is a failure to properly diagnose and treat a condition, it 
may be difficult to determine when in the course of treatment the 
physician breached a duty.82  Under those circumstances, the courts 
have applied the termination of treatment rule and have held that 
a medical malpractice cause of action will not accrue until the 
patient ceases treatment with the defendant physician.83  
Essentially, under this rule, it is assumed that the negligent conduct 
of the physician occurred on the last date of treatment unless the 
plaintiff’s injury was caused by a discrete, identifiable act.84  The 
defendant physicians advocated application of the termination of 
treatment rule, arguing that the Molloys’ action was therefore time-
barred.85 
However, Minnesota courts have also held that a cause of 
action does not “accrue” until it may be brought without dismissal 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.86  As 
stated in Offerdahl, “[a]lleged negligence coupled with the alleged 
resulting damage is the gravamen in deciding the date when a 
cause of action accrues.”87  An example of the application of this 
rule is Peterson v. St. Cloud Hospital.88  In that case, a pathologist 
negligently analyzed a specimen from a brain tumor and 
concluded that the specimen was malignant.89  Several weeks later, 
the patient began chemotherapy and radiation therapy.90  Several 
months later, however, it was determined that the pathologist was 
 
 81. See Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Schmitt v. 
Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 86, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929). 
 82. See Offerdahl v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 429 
(Minn. 1988) (citing Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 180 N.W.2d 187, 189 
(1970)). 
 83. See Grondahl, 318 N.W.2d at 243; Schmitt, 226 N.W. at 197. 
 84. See Offerdahl, 426 N.W.2d at 429.  
 85. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 720 (Minn. 2004). 
 86. Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 
(1968). 
 87. 426 N.W.2d at 429 (applying the holdings of Dalton in the medical 
malpractice context). 
 88. 460 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 89. Id. at 637. 
 90. Id. 
11
Hallberg and Fariss: Molloy v. Meier Extends Genetic Counseling Duty of Care to Biolog
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
6HALLBERGMCCLAIN.DOC 3/13/2005  3:32:21 PM 
950 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
in error and that the patient did not have a malignant condition.91   
The patient commenced a medical malpractice action against 
the pathologist.92  At the time the action was commenced, the 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions was two years 
from the date the cause of action accrued.93  The plaintiff 
commenced his action more than two years after the date of the 
misdiagnosis but less than two years after the date he began 
chemotherapy treatment.94  The court of appeals held that the 
patient sustained no harm until the date of chemotherapy and, 
therefore, the cause of action did not accrue until that date.95  Prior 
to the date of chemotherapy, the plaintiff’s cause of action would 
not have survived a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.96 
Relying upon the rationale of Offerdahl and Peterson, Molloy 
argued that there was no harm until M.M. was conceived and, 
therefore, the cause of action did not accrue until that date.97  
Stated another way, any action commenced by Molloy prior to the 
date of M.M.’s conception would have not survived a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.98 
The supreme court’s analysis in Molloy essentially treated the 
task as one of statutory construction.  The statute provided that the 
cause of action “must be commenced within four years from the 
date the cause of action accrued.”99  The Molloy court reasoned: “An 
action does not ‘accrue’ until it may be brought without dismissal 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”100  
“According to Webster’s Dictionary, ‘accrue’ is defined as ‘to come 
into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a right.’”101  “In the 
context of a malpractice action, the action accrues when the 
plaintiff establishes each of the four elements of negligence.”102  
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. MINN. STAT.  §§ 541.01, 541.07(1) (1988). 
 94. Peterson, 460 N.W.2d at 637. 
 95. Id. at 639. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 720 (Minn. 2004). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 721 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 541.076(b) (2002) (emphasis added)). 
 100. Id. (citing Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d 
580, 584 (1968)). 
 101. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 13 (3d ed. 
1961)). 
 102. Id. (citing Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 
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The four elements of negligence are duty, breach of duty, causal 
harm, and legal damages.103  The Molloy court observed that even 
though “there is no dispute that the alleged breach of duty 
occurred on the last date of treatment for each physician . . . the 
cause of action will not accrue until plaintiff has suffered some 
injury, so the question is: What is the injury and when did it 
occur?”104  It was Molloy’s claim that the harm occurred at the date 
of conception and that all damages occurred on or after that date. 
The defendant doctors cited Fabio v. Bellomo,105 arguing that in 
a case of misdiagnosis, the action accrues on the date of the 
misdiagnosis.106  Fabio raised the accrual issue in the context of the 
repeated failure of a physician to diagnose breast cancer in his 
patient.  Understanding the facts in Fabio are crucial to 
understanding its holding.  The plaintiff in Fabio treated with the 
defendant, Bellomo, from 1977 until 1986.107  The plaintiff alleged 
that on one occasion between 1982 and 1984 and on another 
occasion, March 10, 1986, plaintiff had complained of a lump in 
her left breast.108  On both occasions, defendant Bellomo told 
plaintiff “not to worry” because the lump was a fibrous mass.109  
After March 10, 1986, Dr. Bellomo retired and plaintiff switched 
her care to another physician.110  In 1987, that physician 
recommended a mammogram and thereafter diagnosed a breast 
cancer that had metastasized to four lymph nodes.111  The plaintiff 
offered expert testimony that Dr. Bellomo had departed from 
accepted standards of practice in failing to offer mammography at 
the time the plaintiff had complained of a lump prior to 1984 and 
in 1986.112  In addition, expert testimony established that the 
cancer had “more probably than not” spread from the breast to the 
lymph nodes between 1984 and 1987.113  However, the plaintiff 
failed to offer any evidence that her cancer would recur or that she 
 
1982)). 
 103. PROSSER, supra note 68, at 143–45. 
 104. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 721. 
 105. 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993). 
 106. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 720. 
 107. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 760. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 761. 
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had a diminished life expectancy.114  Therefore, even after 
diagnosis and treatment, it was “more probable” that the plaintiff 
was cured of her cancer.115 
The plaintiff commenced a timely action alleging negligence 
for the misdiagnosis on March 10, 1986.116  Prior to trial, plaintiff 
sought to amend her complaint to include an allegation of 
negligence for the misdiagnosis that occurred prior to 1984.117  The 
district court denied the motion to amend.118 The supreme court 
affirmed the district holding that examination of the breast before 
1984 was not part of a continuing course of treatment and the 
motion to amend should be denied because more than two years 
had passed.119  The implication of the holding was that the statute 
of limitations began to run on the date of misdiagnosis.  However, 
the court did not address if or when any legal damage had 
occurred.  There was an absence of proof on the extent of legal 
damages and, therefore, denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend was 
not an abuse of discretion.120  Importantly, the Fabio court did not 
decide, and did not even address, whether “some damages,” the 
ongoing presence of cancer cells, was enough for the cause of 
action to accrue. 
 Returning to Molloy, the defendants cited Fabio for the 
proposition that “some damage occurs as ‘a matter of law’ when the 
physician fails to make a correct diagnosis and recommend the 
appropriate treatment.”121  The Molloy court accepted this 
proposition in its attempt to distinguish the holding in Molloy from 
the holding in Fabio: 
We agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals on 
this point.  The misdiagnosis in Fabio caused the plaintiff 
immediate injury in the form of a continually growing 
cancer, which became more dangerous to the plaintiff 
each day it was left untreated.  The action accrued at the 
time of misdiagnosis because some damage occurred 
 
 114. Id. at 763. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 760. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 761. 
 119. Id. at 762.  The statute of limitations for malpractice actions was two years 
at that time.  MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1986). 
 120. Fabio, 504 N.W.2d at 762. 
 121. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 2004) (citing Fabio, 504 
N.W.2d at 762). 
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immediately.  In the case of failure to diagnose Fragile X, 
however, the error does not directly damage the patient 
and but for the fact that she conceived another child, 
Molloy would have suffered no damage. . . .122 
The court reasoned that a claim based on negligence in failing to 
diagnose a genetic condition in a child accrues on the date of 
conception of a subsequent child because no damage occurs until 
that date.123  In Molloy, M.M. was conceived in September 1997 and 
the action was commenced in August 2001, falling within the four-
year statute of limitations.124 
 The attempt to distinguish Molloy and Fabio is based on a 
misunderstanding of the holding in Fabio and results in a different 
definition of “accrued” as used in Minnesota Statutes section 
541.076, depending on whether the action involves a failure to 
diagnose a genetic condition (“legal” damage is required) or a 
failure to diagnose cancer (only “some” damage, the presence of 
cancer cells, is required).  The “some” damage definition of accrual 
in the delay of diagnosis of cancer cases is, however, directly 
contrary to the holding in Leubner v. Sterner;125 a tumor’s 
“unchecked growth” is not considered legal damages unless there is 
also proof that it is more probable than not that plaintiff will not 
survive her cancer because of the “unchecked growth.”126 
In most cases involving a misdiagnosis of cancer, no “legal” 
damage occurs until the passage of time causes the patient’s 
prognosis to change from a probability of survival (with timely 
treatment) to a probability of death (with delayed treatment).127  
Leubner very clearly held that a negligent misdiagnosis case does not 
exist until some legal damage occurs even though the presence of 
cancer cells in the patient’s body causes “some harm” on the date 
of misdiagnosis.128  Accordingly, there is an inconsistency in the 
definition of accrual in a misdiagnosis of cancer cause of action.  A 
plaintiff in such a case must establish legal harm, as defined by 
 
 122. Id. at 722. 
 123. Id.; see Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174–75 (Minn. 
1977). 
 124. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 722. 
 125. 493 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1992). 
 126. Id. at 121. 
 127. See, e.g., Leubner v. Sterner. 493 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1992). 
 128. Id. at 121; see also Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 154, 158 
N.W.2d 580, 585 (1968) (quoting Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797, 
800 (6th Cir. 1960) (cause of action accrues when plaintiff sustains some damage)). 
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Leubner, in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim for relief.  In contrast, a defendant bringing a motion for 
summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations would 
only have to establish “some damage,” the presence of cancer cells.  
In Molloy, the supreme court tacitly approved the “some damage” 
rule of accrual without analyzing whether plaintiff sustained “legal 
damage” as defined by Luebner.129 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MOLLOY 
 
A. Legal Duty 
 
The holding in Molloy recognizes a legal duty on the part of a 
physician ordering genetic tests, and extends that duty to the 
patient’s biological parents who are in the child-bearing years.130  
The court specifically reserved for another time, however, the issue 
of whether the duty extends to other relatives.131  Clearly, the 
existence of the Fragile X gene in a child could have genetic 
implications for other relatives such as siblings of the child’s 
biological parents.  Applying the foreseeability of harm rule, one 
could argue that it is foreseeable that other relatives would be 
harmed by negligence in performing the genetic counseling role.  
The Molloy decision raises such questions as whether the duty 
extends to other relatives, and whether the duty is satisfied by 
advising the biological parents of all genetic implications. 
Perhaps these issues will be determined by the standards of 
practice that develop in response to Molloy.  If physicians who 
perform genetic testing establish a standard of care of notifying 
biological parents, following the court’s rationale in Molloy, the 
duty would then be limited to biological parents.  In the alternative, 
this is an issue that might be appropriate for legislation.  Following 
the 1984 decision of Lundgren v. Fultz,132 and the 1982 decision of 
Cairl v. State,133 the legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes section 
148.975.  This statute defines the duty to warn a third party of a 
violent threat made by a patient134 and also established that a 
 
 129. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 721–22. 
 130. Id. at 719–20. 
 131. Id. at 720. 
 132. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984). 
 133. 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982). 
 134. MINN. STAT. § 148.975, subd. (2) (2004). 
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practitioner had immunity if he or she made a good faith effort to 
warn against or take precautions against a patient’s violent 
behavior.135  In the genetic counseling arena, such legislation could 
identify the scope of the duty and provide that the duty is satisfied 
by providing the information to a defined class of relatives such as 
the parents and siblings of the patient.  Such legislation would have 
to take into account the potential privacy issues as well.136 
B. Statute of Limitations 
The Molloy court’s holding that the cause of action does not 
accrue until conception could result in a timely action being 
commenced several years after the medical treatment ended.  
Accordingly, concerns regarding stale claims and the ability to 
provide an adequate defense will exist.  Perhaps a solution to this 
issue would be a statute of repose that would require any such 
claims be commenced within a certain number of years of the date 
treatment terminated. 
An equally perplexing problem created by Molloy is reconciling 
the difference between “accrual” of an action for failure to 
diagnose a genetic condition and “accrual” of an action for failure 
to diagnose cancer.  The application of the rule that a cause of 
action does not accrue until “legal” damage occurs would require 
the court to overrule Fabio and modify its suggestion that “some” 
damage, the unchecked growth of cancer, is sufficient for accrual 
for statute of limitations purposes.  Instead, the court would need 
to hold that an action arising from a delay in the diagnosis of 
cancer will not accrue until the patient sustains the legal damages 
as set forth in Leubner.  That is, there can be no accrual until the 
patient’s prognosis changes from a probability of survival to a 
probability of death. 
 
 135. MINN. STAT. § 148.975, subd. (8) (2004). 
 136. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), passed 
by Congress in late 1996, includes patient privacy protections designed to 
safeguard the security and confidentiality of health information.  Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7c to –7e (1996). 
The legislation does not restrict the ability of doctors and other health care 
providers to share information that is required for patient treatment.  Id.  If 
legislation were passed requiring the distribution of the results of genetic testing 
to an identified class, providers would be well advised to provide notice to their 
patients on the potential use of their identifiable medical information and their 
rights in this regard. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Molloy decision breaks new ground in Minnesota by 
determining that medical practitioners who perform genetic 
testing owe a legal duty of care to persons other than the patient 
being tested.  That duty now extends to biological parents of the 
patient.  In addition, the Molloy court adopts a definition of accrual 
that looks to the date actual legal harm occurs.  Unfortunately, the 
court’s attempt to distinguish Fabio has created uncertainty.  This 
uncertainty will require further analysis by the supreme court in 
future decisions. 
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